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ARTICLE 
Take it to the Limit:  The Illegal Regulation 
Prohibiting the Take of Any Threatened 
Species Under the Endangered Species Act 
JONATHAN WOOD* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In adopting the Endangered Species Act, Congress sought to 
cure two shortcomings of its prior efforts to protect species. First, 
it addressed the lack of protection for species until they reached a 
dire state by establishing two categories of species, endangered 
and threatened.1  Threatened species—the new category—are not 
imminently at risk of going extinct, but are likely to become 
endangered in the foreseeable future.2  To prevent that, the 
statute requires government agencies to proactively protect these 
species while exercising their existing powers.3 
Second, the statute added additional protection for those 
species most at risk by forbidding private activity that harms any 
member of an endangered species, which the statute refers to as 
“take.”4  Congress expressly limited this burdensome prohibition 
to endangered species.5  Private activity affecting threatened 
species is left unregulated, unless the agencies charged with 
implementing the statute deem it necessary and advisable to 
 
*   Jonathan Wood is a Staff Attorney at Pacific Legal Foundation. Damien 
M. Schiff, Luke Wake, Wencong Fa and Ethan Blevins deserve thanks for 
helpful insight, comments, and edits.   
1.  See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a) (2012). 
2.  See id. § 1532(6), (20). 
3.  See id. § 1536(a)–(b). 
4.  Id. §§ 1532(19), 1538(a).  
5.  See id. § 1538(a)(1). 
1
WOOD_PS_WD_FINAL_MACRO 12/16/2015  12:47 PM 
24 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33 
adopt regulations to extend the prohibition to a particular 
species.6 
Rather than respecting Congress’ policy choice, the agencies 
adopted a regulation broadly prohibiting the take of any 
threatened species.7  Turning the statutory standard on its head, 
they only reduce burdens on private activity if an exemption is 
necessary and advisable for the conservation of the species.8  This 
approach conflicts with the statute’s text, legislative history, and 
canons of statutory interpretation. 
The only court to consider the regulation’s legality upheld it, 
relying on Chevron. But this decision was in error. The 
interpretation is ineligible for Chevron deference and contrary to 
the statute. To uphold the regulation, the D.C. Circuit deferred to 
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s argument that Section 4(d) of 
the Endangered Species Act permits it to broadly forbid the take 
of threatened species subject to no limitations or standards 
whatsoever. This interpretation is not only contrary to the text of 
the Endangered Species Act but, since it allows the Service to 
ignore the burdens imposed on property owners, also 
unreasonable.9 
Part II of this article will provide a brief background on the 
adoption of the Endangered Species Act. Part III will explain that 
the statute does not authorize the agencies to extend the take 
prohibition to all threatened species. Part IV will argue that 
returning to the statutory scheme would result in a fairer 
distribution of the costs of species protection by imposing the 
costs of prophylactic protection on agencies and the public 
generally. Burdening individuals would be a last resort, as 
Congress intended. Finally, Part V will identify how Congress’ 
policy is a reasonable way to align private incentives with species 
protection. The statute’s approach would encourage property 
owners to stop a threatened species’ further slide, to avoid 
imposition of the take prohibition, and to recover endangered 
species to the point where they can be downlisted and the take 
 
6.  See id. § 1533(d). 
7.  See 50 C.F.R. § 17.31 (2015). 
8.  See, e.g., Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Revising the 
Special Rule for the Utah Prairie Dog; Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 46,158, 46,159 
(Aug. 2, 2012) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). 
9.  See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2717 (2015). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol33/iss1/2
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prohibition lifted. This would make the statute more effective at 
accomplishing its primary goal – recovering species to the point 
that they no longer require protection. 
II.  FEDERAL EFFORTS TO CURB SPECIES 
EXTINCTION 
The federal government’s role in protecting wildlife has 
increased along with the Supreme Court’s expansion of the 
Commerce Clause power.10  Initially, federal regulation of wildlife 
was limited to facilitating enforcement of state law. The Lacey 
Act, for instance, prohibited the transportation in interstate 
commerce of fish or wildlife taken in violation of state or foreign 
laws.11  With the adoption of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act in 
1918, the federal government took a more active role in protecting 
particular species that raised both interstate and international 
issues.12  Other early federal efforts protected wildlife on federal 
property.13 
 
10.  Historically, the federal role was sharply limited. In 1896, the Supreme 
Court held that states have primary responsibility for protecting wildlife, 
relying on ferae naturae—the concept of state ownership of wildlife. See Geer v. 
Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 527–28 (1896). For decades, Geer was understood to 
give the states exclusive power over wildlife except in narrow circumstances 
implicating federal authority. See William S. Boyd, Note, Federal Protection of 
Endangered Wildlife Species, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1289, 1303 (1970); cf. Randy E. 
Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health Insurance 
Mandate is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 581, 587–603 (2010) 
(explaining the Commerce Clause’s evolution through the New Deal and the 
Rehnquist court). 
11.  See Lacey Act of 1900, ch. 552–53, 31 Stat. 187, (1900) (partially 
codified in 16 U.S.C. §§ 667e, 701 (1904)) (§ 667e repealed 1981); see also Black 
Bass Act of 1926, ch. 346, 44 Stat. 576 (1926) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 851-56 
(1928)) (repealed 1981). 
12.  See Migratory Bird Treaty Act, ch. 128, 40 Stat. 755 (1918) (codified as 
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–12 (2012)); see also Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 
416, 434–35 (1920). Congress also adopted a statute to specifically protect the 
bald eagle. Act of June 8, 1940, ch. 278, 54 Stat. 250 (1940); see Ronald J. 
Mazzucco, Note, Federal and State Protection Against Commercial Exploitation 
of Endangered Wildlife, 17 CATH. LAW. 241, 244 (1971). 
13.  See e.g., Land and Water Conservation Fund Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 
88-578, 78 Stat. 897 (1965) (current version at 16 U.S.C. §§ 460l-4–460l-11 
(2012)). 
3
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The first major federal statute protecting endangered species 
generally was the Endangered Species Act of 1966.14  This statute 
authorized the federal government to purchase land to conserve 
and propagate endangered species.15  To this, the Endangered 
Species Conservation Act of 1969 added a prohibition against the 
importation of certain endangered species and the transportation 
or sale of wildlife taken in violation of federal, state, or foreign 
law.16  These enactments were “‘the most comprehensive of [their] 
type to be enacted by any nation’” up to that time.17 
However, by 1973, many thought that the problem required a 
more aggressive approach. In his State of the Union address, 
President Nixon proposed protecting species before they become 
endangered and federal regulation of private activities that affect 
them once they do.18  Representative John Dingell, the author of 
the bill that would ultimately become the Endangered Species 
Act, had the same concerns. He explained that the chief defect of 
prior efforts was the failure to protect species that “are being 
heavily exploited and are in trouble, but are not yet on the brink 
of extinction.”19  Many other members of the House and Senate 
 
14.  Endangered Species Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-669, 80 Stat. 926 
(1966) (repealed 1973). 
15.  See George Cameron Coggins, Conserving Wildlife Resources: An 
Overview of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 51 N.D. L. REV. 315, 317 (1975) 
(describing the federal precursors to the Endangered Species Act of 1973). 
16.  Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-135, 83 
Stat. 275 (1969) (repealed 1973); see Mazzucco, supra note 13, at 245–50 
(summarizing the provisions of the Endangered Species Conservation Act of 
1969). 
17.  See Tenn.Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 176 (1978) (quoting 
Hearings on Endangered Species Before the Subcomm. On Fisheries & Wildlife 
Conservation & the Env’t of the H. Comm. on Merchant Marine & Fisheries, 93d 
Cong. 202 (1973) (statement of Nathanal P. Reed, Assistant Secretary of the 
Interior)). 
18.  “The limited scope of existing laws requires new authority to identify 
and protect endangered species before they are so depleted that it is too late. 
New legislation must also make the taking of an endangered animal a Federal 
offense.” Richard Nixon, State of the Union Message to the Congress on Natural 
Resources and the Environment (Feb. 15, 1973) (transcript available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=4102 [http://perma.cc/3497-NM7V]); see 
also S. REP. NO. 93-307, at 3 (1973), reprinted in CONG. RESEARCH SERV., A 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT OF 1973, AS AMENDED IN 
1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, AND 1980, at 302 (1982) [hereinafter ESA LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY] (endorsing President Nixon’s State of the Union Message). 
19.   ESA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 18, at 72 (statement of Rep. 
Dingell); id. at 193 (listing the protection of threatened species and the 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol33/iss1/2
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stressed the importance of protecting species before they reached 
endangered status.20  The House and Senate Reports also 
stressed these two innovations as central to the legislation.21 
Ultimately, the Endangered Species Act embraced both 
innovations. It provides for species to be listed as either 
endangered or threatened based on the immediacy of the threat 
they face.22  The statute protects listed species in three ways. 
First, it requires federal agencies to “seek to conserve” them while 
exercising their powers and “insure” that their activities are not 
“likely to jeopardize” them.23  Second, it provides for the 
designation and protection of “critical habitat.”24  Third, to 
protect those species facing the greatest threats, it imposes 
criminal and civil penalties for “take” of endangered species—i.e. 
any private activity that has an adverse effect on any member of 
the species.25  The statute does not regulate private activities 
 
regulation of private activity as the first and third most important innovations 
of the Endangered Species Act).  
20.  See id. at 196–97 (statement of Rep. Goodling); id. at 201 (statement of 
Rep. Leggett) (“[E]xisting law just does not provide the kind of management 
tools we need to act early enough to save a vanishing species.”); id. at 202 
(statement of Rep. Biaggi) (“Instead of merely protecting those species which are 
now in danger . . . [w]e are including those species which, at some future date, 
might become endangered.”); id. at 204 (statement of Rep. Clausen) (“The most 
important feature of the bill is the provision extending protection to animals and 
plants which may become endangered within the foreseeable future. In the past, 
little action was taken until the situation became critical and the species was 
dangerously close to total extinction.”); id. at 205 (statement of Rep. Gilman); id. 
at 357 (statement of Sen. Tunney). 
21.  H.R. REP. NO. 93-412 (1973), reprinted in ESA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
supra note 18, at 141; S. REP. NO. 93-307, at 3, reprinted in ESA LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY, supra note 18, at 302–03. 
22.  16 U.S.C. § 1533(a (2012)); see 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (defining 
“endangered” species); id. § 1532(20) (defining “threatened” species). See 
generally Holly Doremus, Listing Decisions Under the Endangered Species Act:  
Why Better Science Isn’t Always Better Policy, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1029 (1997) 
(describing the listing process). 
23.  16 U.S.C. 1531(c)(1); id. § 1536; see Tenn.Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 
153, 174 (1978) (stating agencies must conserve species at all cost because 
“Congress intended endangered species to be afforded the highest of priority”). 
24.  16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3); see Oliver A. Houck, The Endangered Species 
Act and Its Implementation by the U.S. Departments of Interior and Commerce, 
64 U. COLO. L. REV. 277, 296–314 (1993). 
25.  16 U.S.C. § 1540 (providing civil and criminal penalties for violating 
the take prohibition); see id. § 1532(19) (defining “take”); id. § 1538(a) 
(prohibiting “take”); see also Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a 
Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 703 (1995) (upholding broad interpretation of take). See 
5
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affecting threatened species.26  Instead, Congress delegated to the 
Secretaries of Commerce and Interior the authority to adopt 
regulations for threatened species if necessary and advisable to 
provide for their conservation, including regulations prohibiting 
take.27 
III.  THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT DOES NOT 
AUTHORIZE A BLANKET EXTENSION OF THE 
TAKE PROHIBITION TO ALL THREATENED 
SPECIES 
Shortly after the statute was enacted, the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service—the 
agencies charged with implementing the statute—adopted a 
regulation prohibiting any take of any threatened species unless 
the Services adopt a more specific regulation for that species.28  
The regulation applies prospectively to every species 
subsequently listed as threatened.29 
This blanket extension of the take prohibition has been 
challenged only once, in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of 
Communities for a Great Oregon.30  Citizen groups, lumber 
companies, and trade associations challenged the application of 
the blanket prohibition to the northern spotted owl, protections 
for which frustrated timber harvesting.31  Ultimately, the D.C. 
 
generally Frederico M. Cheever, An Introduction to the Prohibition Against 
Takings in Section 9 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973: Learning to Live 
with a Powerful Species Preservation Law, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 109 (1991). 
26.  See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a). 
27.  Id. § 1533(d); see also id. § 1540 (providing penalties for violating 
regulations adopted under the statute). 
28.  Reclassification of the American Alligator and Other Amendments, 40 
Fed. Reg. 44,412, 44,414, 44,425 (Sept. 26, 1975) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 
17). 
29.  See In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing & 4(d) Rule Litig., 
818 F. Supp. 2d 214, 229 (D.D.C. 2011); 50 C.F.R. § 17.31 (2015); cf. Sierra Club 
v. Clark, 755 F.2d 608, 614–15 (8th Cir. 1985) (construing the blanket extension 
to forbid the agency from allowing take of any threatened species unless 
necessary to relieve population pressures on the ecosystem). 
30.  Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or. v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1 
(D.C. Cir. 1993). 
31.  See Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or. v. Lujan, 806 F. 
Supp. 279, 282 (D.D.C. 1992). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol33/iss1/2
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Circuit sustained the regulation.32  It found the statutory 
language ambiguous, reasoning that “any threatened species” 
does not necessarily mean “any one threatened species” as 
opposed to “any or all threatened species.”33  It also reasoned that 
the second sentence of Section 4(d)—which expressly authorizes 
regulation of take of threatened species—could be a separate 
grant of power from that in the first sentence, meaning its 
restrictive language would not apply to a regulation prohibiting 
take.34  Turning to the legislative history, the Court noted a 
“conflict” between the Senate Report, which limits Section 4(d) to 
species-specific regulations, and the House Report, which is 
ambiguous.35  Finally, it criticized the challengers’ reliance on the 
use of the singular in Section 4(d), noting that singular references 
in statutory text include the plural and vice versa.36  In light of 
this purported ambiguity, the court deferred to the Service’s 
interpretation under Chevron, USA, Inc. v. NRDC, Inc.37 
The D.C. Circuit’s rush to apply Chevron suffers from a 
number of defects. First, the court’s determination that Section 
4(d) is ambiguous is belied by the text, legislative history, and the 
constitutional avoidance canon (an issue not presented to the 
court). Second, Chevron deference is inappropriate because the 
regulation adopted doesn’t purport to interpret the statute.38  In 
adopting the regulation, the Services offered no reasoned basis for 
their decision.39  Nor did they articulate any interpretation of 
Section 4(d).40  The interpretation upheld in Sweet Home was 
 
32.  Sweet Home, 1 F.3d at 8. 
33.  Id. at 6. 
34.  See id.  
35.  Id.; see ESA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 18, at 151, 307. 
36.  Sweet Home, 1 F.3d at 6–7. 
37.  Id. at 6. See generally Chevron, USA, Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984) (establishing a judicial test for reviewing an agency’s construction of 
statute agency implements); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to 
Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511 (1989) (discussing 
the judicial approach to agency deference).  
38.  See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (explaining that the deference is to be 
afforded to administrative interpretations adopted as legislative regulations 
interpreting and implementing an ambiguous statutory scheme). 
39.  See Reclassification of the American Alligator and Other Amendments, 
40 Fed. Reg. 44,412, 44,413–15 (Sept. 26, 1975) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 
17); cf. Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 
29, 43 (1983). 
40.  See Reclassification of the American Alligator, 40 Fed. Reg. at 44,414. 
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first articulated during that litigation.41  Such interpretations are 
entitled to, at most, Skidmore deference.42  But not even this is 
available because the Service represented to Congress during the 
debate over the statute that the power is limited to species-
specific regulations.43  Agency flip-flops, particularly unexplained 
ones, are not entitled to Skidmore deference.44  Finally, deference 
is inappropriate because the power to regulate any private 
activity that affects any threatened species for any or no reason is 
exceedingly broad, with corresponding economic and political 
significance. Thus this is the type of power that, if Congress 
wished to grant it, would be announced in a clear statement.45  I 
will address each of these issues in turn. 
A.  The Text 
Section 4(d) provides, in relevant part, that: 
Whenever any species is listed as a threatened species . . . the 
Secretary shall issue such regulations as he deems necessary and 
advisable to provide for the conservation of such species. The 
Secretary may by regulation prohibit with respect to any 
threatened species any act prohibited under section 
1538(a)(1) . . . or section 1538(a)(2) . . . with respect to 
endangered species.46 
Devoid of context, “with respect to any threatened species” 
could be construed to allow a blanket extension of the take 
prohibition.47  However, ambiguity is not assessed by looking at a 
word or phrase in isolation; the whole text, context, its placement 
in the larger statutory scheme, and interpretive canons all play a 
 
41.  Cf. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 213 (1988) 
(“Deference to what appears to be nothing more than an agency’s convenient 
litigating position would be entirely inappropriate.”). 
42.  See Bradley George Hubbard, Comment, Deference to Agency Statutory 
Interpretations First Advanced in Litigation? The Chevron Two-Step and the 
Skidmore Shuffle, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 447, 460–66 (2013). 
43.  See infra notes 83–84. 
44.  See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 125–26, 
160 (2000). 
45.  Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014). 
46.  16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (2012). 
47.  See Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or. v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1, 
6 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol33/iss1/2
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role.48  In context, the text compels the conclusion that the 
agencies’ authority is limited to species-specific take regulations. 
First, when Congress wanted to refer to endangered or 
threatened species as a category it did not use “any” in this way. 
For example, Section 4(d) refers to particular threatened species 
using “any.”49  On the other hand, the second sentence refers to 
the protection of endangered species as a category by omitting 
“any,” saying instead “with respect to endangered species.”50  
Interestingly, when the D.C. Circuit attempted to distinguish the 
power to adopt species-specific regulations from the power to 
adopt categorical regulations, the phrasing it chose was precisely 
that used in the statute.51  In finding ambiguity, the court 
explained that it could not distinguish “any threatened species” 
from “any or all threatened species.”52  However, in the D.C. 
Circuit’s re-imagination of the statutory text, “any threatened 
species” means a specific threatened species, just as it does in the 
statute’s text.53 
Second, the limitations on the authority set out in the first 
sentence of Section 4(d) could not be satisfied by the blanket 
extension of the take prohibition to all threatened species. 
Although the D.C. Circuit held that the second sentence could be 
 
48.  King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488–89 (2015); see City of Arlington 
v. F.C.C., 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1875 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
49.  16 U.S.C. § 1533(d). 
50.  Id. 
51.  See Sweet Home, 1 F.3d at 6–7. The courts have routinely interpreted 
“any” in similar statutory schemes, including environmental statutes, the same 
way. The Clean Air Act, for instance, requires EPA to adopt regulations for 
“emission of any air pollutant” from mobile sources, not pollutants generally.  42 
U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2012). This provision has been construed as the power to 
regulate particular pollutants. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 
528–29 (2007). 
52.  See Sweet Home, 1 F.3d at 6 (adding “or all” to signify categorical 
regulations). 
53.  See id. There is also evidence in the legislative history that Congress 
was aware of the difference between these textual formulations. The Senate 
Report, for example, construes “any threatened species” to limit the Services to 
adopting species-specific regulations. S. REP. NO. 93-307 (1973), at 7–8 (1973), 
reprinted in ESA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 18, at 306–07. However, 
when referring to the activities that could be regulated to protect a particular 
species, it explained that the Services “‘may make any or all of the acts and 
conduct defined as [“take”] . . . also prohibited acts as to the particular 
threatened species.’” Sweet Home, 1 F.3d at 6 (emphasis added) (quoting S. Rep. 
No. 93-307). 
9
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construed as an independent grant of authority,54 this reading 
must be rejected. The regulations adopted under the second 
sentence are a logical subset of those addressed in the first. The 
first sentence gives the agencies a broad authority to adopt any 
kind of regulation when a species is listed as threatened, provided 
that it is “necessary and advisable for the conservation of [the] 
species.”55  A regulation prohibiting the take of any such species 
is merely a specific example of the type of regulation that could be 
adopted. 
Although this reading would render the second sentence 
superfluous, it is an understandable redundancy.56  Congress did 
not take the decision to regulate private activity affecting 
endangered species lightly but recognized the burdens this 
regulation would have.57  A reasonable argument could be made 
that Congress would not have conferred this great power to the 
agencies without saying so.58  Thus, the second sentence’s specific 
 
54.  Sweet Home, 1 F.3d at 6. 
55.  16 U.S.C. § 1533(d). 
56.  Courts generally resist reading any statutory text to render any part of 
it superfluous. E.g., Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., 486 U.S. 825, 
837 (1988) (“As our cases have noted in the past, we are hesitant to adopt an 
interpretation of a congressional enactment which renders superfluous another 
portion of that same law.”). However, “[s]urplusage does not always produce 
ambiguity” and the preference against surplusage “is not absolute.” Lamie v. 
U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 536 (2004). 
57.  See ESA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 18, at 358 (statement of Sen. 
Tunney). 
58.  The power to regulate any activity affecting any threatened species is a 
great power indeed. It is, for instance, the power to regulate or forbid logging 
throughout the country, housing development, and how water is used during 
severe droughts. Given the vast economic and political significance of this 
power, the first sentence, standing alone, would likely not satisfy the clear 
statement rule articulated in Utility Air Regulatory Group. See  Util. Air 
Regulatory Grp. v. EPA,134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014); see also Whitman v. Am. 
Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (“Congress . . . does not alter the 
fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary 
provisions—it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.”). The 
scope of this power also raises significant constitutional concerns under the 
Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses. See Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial 
Federalism and the Future of Federal Environmental Regulation, 90 IOWA L. 
REV. 377, 406 (2005); Jonathan Wood, A Federal Crime Against Nature: The 
Federal Government Cannot Prohibit Harm to All Endangered Species Under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, 29 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. (forthcoming Dec. 2015); cf. 
People for the Ethical Treatment of Prop. Owners v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 
57 F. Supp. 3d 1337, 1342–46 (D. Utah 2014) (holding that FWS’ regulation of 
take of “purely intrastate species” violates the Commerce Clause).  
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol33/iss1/2
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authorization to extend the take prohibition on a species-by-
species basis is necessary to make clear that the agencies have 
this authority. 
Another textual clue that the power granted in the second 
sentence is not independent of the first sentence’s limitations is 
that when Congress authorized other types of regulations it gave 
each its own statutory section and a standard to guide the 
exercise of that power.59  For example, the next section, Section 
4(e), authorizes the agencies to treat a look-alike species as 
threatened or endangered to aid enforcement of the protections 
for a listed species that it resembles.60  Although the standards 
for the exercise of these authorities are lax—e.g., regulations 
implementing the provisions for financial assistance to states 
need only be “appropriate”61—they at least contain some 
standard.  If the second sentence of Section 4(d) is an 
independent authority, no standard guides its exercise.62  
Consequently, the power articulated in the second sentence must 
be a subset of that in the first sentence, and all of the first 
sentence’s limitations apply to it. 
These limitations foreclose any authority to adopt a blanket 
extension. First, “whenever any species is listed” limits the 
agencies to adopting regulations for species already listed.63  
Prospective regulations of as yet unidentified species would be an 
unreasonable interpretation of this language.64 
Additionally, the agency could not know whether regulation 
would be “necessary and advisable to provide for the conservation 
of such species”65 until it is identified and listed.  Under the 
regulation, the Service never considers whether forbidding the 
 
59.  See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(e) (authorizing “regulation of commerce or taking” 
of look-alike species); id. § 1535(h) (authorizing regulations to aid in assisting 
state conservation); id. § 1538(d)(3) (authorizing regulations governing imports 
and exports). 
60.  Id. § 1533(e). 
61.  Id. § 1535(h).  
62.  See infra notes 88–104 and accompanying text. 
63.  16 U.S.C. § 1533(d). 
64.  See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 484–86 (2001) (no 
deference to an agency’s unreasonable interpretation of a statute); see also 
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc. 467 U.S. 837, 845 (1984) (establishing that 
courts will not uphold unreasonable agency interpretations). 
65.  16 U.S.C. § 1533(d).  
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take of a threatened species is “necessary and advisable.” 
Although, at one time, this might not have seemed like much of a 
difference, since the standard is so vague and capacious, the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Michigan v. EPA suggests otherwise. 
In that case, the Court held that, anytime Congress uses a 
capacious standard to delegate rulemaking authority, the agency 
must consider any and all relevant factors, especially the costs 
and burdens associated with the regulation.66  The “necessary 
and advisable” standard suggests that the agencies should at 
least consider the costs and benefits of regulating the take of 
threatened species to determine appropriateness. 
Often, this standard may not be satisfied for a particular 
species, either because the regulation’s impact on the species’ 
conservation is slight or because it would impose significant 
burdens on individuals, property owners, or industry. In fact, the 
Services seem to recognize as much in the several species-specific 
regulations that pare back the blanket regulation’s application.67  
For each, the agencies recognize that the blanket extension, 
rather than being necessary and advisable to provide for the 
conservation of that species, would be counterproductive.68  Thus, 
one cannot say that prohibiting take of all threatened species is 
necessary and advisable for their conservation across the board.69 
 
66.  See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015).  In Michigan, the 
Supreme Court held that an agency’s interpretation of “appropriate and 
necessary” in the Clean Air Act was unreasonable because it foreclosed any 
consideration of costs. Id. at 2709. 
67.  See, e.g., Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Revising the 
Special Rule for the Utah Prairie Dog, 77 Fed. Reg. 46,158, 46,159 (Aug. 2, 2012) 
(to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).  
68.  See, e.g., id. In finding that less regulation better provides for the 
conservation of a species, the Service implicitly acknowledges that going further 
under the blanket extension would be counterproductive, at least for that 
species. 
69.  That the Service occasionally departs from the blanket extension for 
particular species does not serve as an after-the-fact correction of the problem 
for two reasons. First, there is no indication that, for the great majority of 
species subject to the blanket extension, the Services give any thought to 
whether this burdensome regulation was necessary or advisable. See, e.g., 
Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of Threatened 
Status for the Washington, Oregon, and California Population of the Marbled 
Murrelet, 57 Fed. Reg. 45,328, 45,337 (Oct. 1, 1992) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. 
pt. 17) (noting that, as a threatened species, the blanket take prohibition will 
apply without discussing whether it is necessary and advisable for the 
conservation of the Marbled Murrelet). Second, the agencies only reduce 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol33/iss1/2
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Finally, the statutory scheme counsels against a blanket 
prohibition. Instead of looking at Section 4(d) in isolation, that 
section should be interpreted in light of Congress’ decision to 
expressly limit Section 9—the take prohibition—to endangered 
species.70  Given that Congress rejected the idea of prohibiting all 
take of any threatened species, it makes little sense to interpret 
Section 4(d) to empower the Services to reverse that choice 
immediately thereafter. When Congress wanted endangered and 
threatened species to be treated the same—as it did when 
regulating activities involving federal agencies—it said so 
expressly.71 
B.  Legislative History 
Legislative history reinforces this interpretation. Multiple 
Congressmen and Senators acknowledged that the take 
prohibition imposed significant burdens on affected individuals.72  
Senator Tunney, the floor manager of the bill, explained that the 
prohibition was limited to endangered species to “minimiz[e] the 
use of the most stringent prohibitions. . . . Federal prohibitions 
against taking must be absolutely enforced only for those species 
on the brink of extinction.”73  Senator Stevens similarly described 
 
regulatory burdens if that reduction satisfies the necessary and advisable 
standard. See, e.g., Revising the Special Rule for the Utah Prairie Dog, 77 Fed. 
Reg. at 46,159. Regulatory burdens that are not necessary and advisable for the 
conservation of a particular species, but not quite counterproductive—e.g., a 
take regulation that has no appreciable effect on a species risk of extinction—
continue to be imposed. 
70.  See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1); see also H.R. REP. NO. 93-412 (1973), 
reprinted in ESA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 18, at 154 (“Sec. 9. (a) 
Subparagraphs (1) through (5) of this paragraph spell out a number of activities 
which are specifically prohibited with respect to endangered (not threatened) 
species . . . . It includes, in the broadest possible terms, restrictions on taking . . . 
.”).   
71.  See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533, 1536. 
72.  ESA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 18, at 358 (statement of Sen. 
Tunney); see id. at 359 (describing the protections for endangered species as 
“maximum protection for species on the brink of extinction”); id. at 360 
(describing the Act as “absolute protection for species imminently in danger of 
extinction”); id. (“I feel that this bill provides the necessary national protection 
to severely endangered species while encouraging the States to utilize all of their 
resources toward the furtherance of the purposes of this act.”). 
73.  Id.  at 357 (statement of Sen. Tunney) (emphasis added). 
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the prohibition as “stringent.”74  Yet Congress thought these 
burdens had to be accepted in order to effectively protect species 
in dire states.75 
The Senate Report explicitly interprets Section 4(d) as 
limited to species-specific regulations. It explains that the section: 
requires the Secretary, once he has listed a species of fish or 
wildlife as a threatened species, to issue regulations to protect 
that species. Among other protective measures available, he may 
make any or all of the acts and conduct defined as “prohibited 
acts” . . . as to “endangered species” also prohibited acts as to the 
particular threatened species.76 
This confirms that the power to prohibit take is a subset of 
the authority granted in the Section 4(d)’s first sentence.77  It 
further makes clear that this authority is limited to prohibiting 
the take of “particular threatened species.”78 
In response to the Senate Report’s express endorsement of 
the interpretation, the D.C. Circuit pointed to this language in 
the House Report: 
The Secretary is authorized to issue appropriate regulations to 
protect endangered or threatened species; he may also make 
specifically applicable any of the prohibitions with regard to 
threatened species that have been listed in section 9(a) as are 
prohibited with regard to endangered species. Once an animal is 
on the threatened list, the Secretary has almost an infinite 
number of options available to him with regard to the permitted 
activities for those species. He may, for example, permit taking, 
but not importation of such species, or he may choose to forbid 
both taking and importation but allow the transportation of such 
species.79 
This language does not expressly endorse the power to adopt 
a blanket prohibition. It is at most ambiguous—it could be 
 
74.  Id. at 370. 
75.  See generally id. 
76.  S. REP. NO. 93-307, at 8 (1973), reprinted in ESA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
supra note 18, at 307 (emphasis added). 
77.  See id. (“Among other protective measures available . . . .”). 
78.  Id. (emphasis added). 
79.  H.R. REP. NO. 93-412 (1973), reprinted in ESA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
supra note 18, at 151. 
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interpreted to embrace a blanket authority, but need not be.80  
Nevertheless, the D.C. Circuit relied on this piece of legislative 
history to conclude that the legislative history is ambiguous 
overall, and thus unhelpful in interpreting the statute.81  It did 
not address other aspects of the House Report that suggest that 
this authority was intended to be limited to species-specific 
regulations.82 
The bureaucrats who would ultimately be delegated this 
authority also interpreted this authority as limited to species-
specific regulations. Douglas P. Wheeler, the Acting Assistant 
Secretary of the Interior, for example, told Congress that limiting 
the take prohibition “assure[s] protection of all endangered 
species commensurate with the threat to their continued 
existence.”83  He went on to explain that any regulations adopted 
under Section 4(d) would “depend on the circumstances of each 
species.”84  Yet a mere two years later—after Congress granted it 
the authority—the Department of Interior had an unexplained 
change of heart about the meaning of Section 4(d).85 
 
80.  For instance, the power to make the take prohibition “specifically 
applicable . . . with regard to threatened species” could mean that the 
regulations adopted must be applicable to particular species. Id. (emphasis 
added). Similarly, the last line’s reference to prohibiting take “of such species” 
could be interpreted consistently with species-specific regulations. See id. 
81.  See Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or. v. Babbit, 1 F.3d 1, 
6 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
82.  See H. REP. NO. 93-412, reprinted in ESA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra 
note 18, at 151 (describing this as the authority to “make specifically applicable 
any of the prohibitions with regard to threatened species” (emphasis added)); id. 
at 154 (again referring to “specific[]” rather than general regulations). 
83.  Letter from Douglas P. Wheeler, Acting Assistant Secretary of the 
Interior, to Rep. Leonor Sullivan, Chairman, House Committee on Merchant 
Marine and Fisheries (Mar. 23, 1973), in ESA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 
18, at 162; see also Letter from Rogers C. B. Morton, Secretary of Interior, to 
Rep. Carl Albert, Speaker of the House of Representatives (Feb. 15, 1973), in 
ESA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 18, at 160. 
84.  Letter from Douglas P. Wheeler, supra note 83 (emphasis added). 
Wheeler went on to note that this power “could include a complete or partial ban 
if deemed appropriate.” Id. In context, though, this refers to whether the take 
prohibition would apply completely or only in part to a particular species.  
85.  See Reclassification of the American Alligator and Other Amendments, 
40 Fed. Reg. 44,412, 44,414 (Sept. 26, 1975) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). 
This change of heart casts further doubt on the agency’s reinterpretation. Cf. 
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 145–46, 155–56 
(2000). 
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C.  Constitutional Avoidance 
The interpretation required to sustain the blanket extension 
also raises a potential constitutional problem. The only principle 
in Section 4(d) to guide the Services’ exercise of this power is the 
necessary and advisable standard contained in the first 
sentence.86  If the second sentence is an independent power—as it 
must be to sustain the Services’ power to adopt the blanket 
prohibition87—there is no intelligible principle to guide its 
exercise. 
The nondelegation doctrine forbids Congress from delegating 
power to administrative agencies without providing an 
“intelligible principle” to guide its exercise.88  The failure to 
provide an intelligible principle is particularly alarming here 
because the power allegedly contained in the second sentence of 
Section 4(d) is extremely broad. It would authorize the agencies 
to forbid or exert regulatory control over any activity that affects 
any threatened species, for any reason or no reason whatsoever. 
No criteria would guide its exercise. The Services could forbid 
private activity, or not, as they see fit. It would be difficult to 
imagine a more obvious example of the delegation of legislative 
power to administrative agencies.89 
This asserted power is strikingly similar to that struck down 
under the nondelegation doctrine in Panama Refining.90  In that 
case, an oil company challenged an executive order adopted under 
a provision of the National Industrial Recovery Act that 
authorized the President to prohibit interstate transportation of 
petroleum.91  In holding that the provision violates the 
 
86.  16 U.S.C. §1533(d) (2012). 
87.  See Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or. v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1, 
6 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
88.  See, e.g., J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 
(1928) (delegation of power to an executive agency is constitutional so long as 
Congress provides an “intelligible principle” to guide the agency’s exercise of 
that power); see also A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 
495, 529-32 (1935); Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 414–16 (1935).  
89.  “The nondelegation doctrine is rooted in the principle of separation of 
powers . . . .” Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371 (1989). It forbids 
Congress from delegating its “legislative power” to any other branch. Id. at 371–
72; see Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892). 
90.  Pan. Ref. Co., 293 U.S. at 414–19. 
91.  Id. at 406–07, 410–11. 
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nondelegation doctrine, the Supreme Court stressed that the 
statute “does not qualify the President’s authority”; “does not 
state whether, or in what circumstances or under what 
conditions, the President” was to regulate; “establishes no 
criterion to govern” the exercise of that power; and “does not 
require any finding by the President as a condition of his 
action.”92  The statutory provision at issue in that case “declares 
no policy” as to the regulation of interstate transportation of 
petroleum.93  Rather, “it gives to the President an unlimited 
authority to determine the policy and to lay down the prohibition, 
or not to lay it down, as he may see fit.”94  Consequently, the 
Court held that Congress had unconstitutionally delegated the 
legislative power to the President.95 
Admittedly, courts have not declared a delegation 
unconstitutional since 1935.96  However, this is because the 
standard against which delegations are analyzed—intelligible 
principle—is incredibly lax and easily satisfied so long as 
Congress provides some principle to guide an agency’s decision-
making.97  The Services’ and D.C. Circuit’s interpretation of 
Section 4(d) would render it the rare exception. There is no 
meaningful distinction between “[t]he Secretary may [prohibit 
take]” and “[t]he President is authorized to [prohibit interstate 
transportation of petroleum].”98  Neither provides any guidance 
to how the Secretary or the President, respectively, is supposed to 
exercise the delegated power. 
 
92.  Id. at 415. 
93.  Id. 
94.  Id. 
95.  Id. at 418–19, 433. 
96.  E.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 373 (1989) (“After 
invalidating in 1935 two statutes as excessive delegations, we have upheld, 
again without deviation, Congress’ ability to delegate power under broad 
standards.” (internal citations omitted)).  
97.  Similarly, successful challenges to economic regulations under the Due 
Process Clause have been exceedingly rare since the Supreme Court adopted the 
rational basis test. See generally TIMOTHY M. SANDEFUR, THE RIGHT TO EARN A 
LIVING: ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND THE LAW 123–40 (2010). However, this does not 
mean that, in the rare case that the government goes too far, courts will not 
strike down unconstitutional laws. See, e.g., Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978, 
991–92 (9th Cir. 2008); Bruner v. Zawacki, 997 F. Supp. 2d 691, 701 (E.D. Ky. 
2014). 
98.  Pan. Ref. Co., 293 U.S. at 406.  
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Although the Supreme Court has not struck down a statute 
under this doctrine since 1935, it has repeatedly invoked it and 
the avoidance canon when interpreting statutes that raise 
nondelegation questions.99  Therefore, if Section 4(d) were 
otherwise ambiguous, the Services’ interpretation must be 
rejected to avoid interpreting the statute in a manner that raises 
the nondelegation problem. Constitutional avoidance is an 
interpretive canon that directs courts to interpret statutory 
provisions so as to avoid calling their constitutionality into doubt, 
if possible.100  Here, the nondelegation problem presented by the 
D.C. Circuit’s interpretation in Sweet Home can be avoided by 
construing the two sentences in Section 4(d) together, so that the 
limits in the first sentence apply to any take regulations.101  
Those limits would provide the required intelligible principle.102  
They would also limit the power to adopting species-specific 
regulations.103 
D.  Chevron is inapplicable 
Finally, the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Sweet Home is wrong 
because Chevron deference does not apply to the agency’s 
 
99.  See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 373 n.7 (“In recent years, our application of 
the nondelegation doctrine principally has been limited to the interpretation of 
statutory texts, and, more particularly, to giving narrow constructions to 
statutory delegations that might otherwise be thought to be unconstitutional.”); 
C. Boyden Gray, The Nondelegation Canon’s Neglected History and 
Underestimated Legacy, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 619, 622–26 (2015). 
100.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2593 (2012) 
(“[I]t is well established that if a statute has two possible meanings, one of 
which violates the Constitution, courts should adopt the meaning that does not 
do so.”); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades 
Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988); Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927) 
(Holmes, J., concurring); Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 448–49 (1830). 
101.  Cf. Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) 
(stating courts must adopt any “fairly possible” interpretation of a statute that 
avoids a serious constitutional question). 
102.  Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (2012) (establishing “necessary and 
advisable to provide for the conservation of such species” standard), with Touby 
v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 163, 165–66 (1991) (holding “necessary to avoid 
an imminent hazard to the public safety” an intelligible principle). Although 
both provide ample policy-making authority to the agency, each provides at least 
some guidance as to how such decisions should be made. Cf. Pan. Ref. Co., 293 
U.S. at 415, 420. 
103.  See supra notes 54–69 and accompanying text. 
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interpretation of Section 4(d). The foremost reason is that, as 
explained above, the statutory text is not ambiguous, especially in 
light of the constitutional avoidance canon.104  But there are two 
additional reasons why the D.C. Circuit erred in applying 
Chevron. First, the court did not have before it a regulation 
interpreting the statute. The interpretation to which the court 
deferred was articulated only as the Service’s litigation position 
and was thus at most entitled to Skidmore deference.105  Second, 
deference to this interpretation is inappropriate because a clear 
statement rule applies to assertions of power of such vast 
economic and political significance.106  This is particularly true 
where, as here, the question is about one of the key reforms of the 
statute.107 
Chevron deference is improper because the Service offered no 
interpretation of Section 4(d) in its regulation. In fact, the 
Federal Register Notice announcing the regulation is silent as to 
the standard governing its adoption or the basis for concluding 
any such standard was satisfied.108  The regulation extended the 
take prohibition to all threatened species without comment or 
explanation.109  This failure to analyze the costs and burdens of 
regulating take alone is sufficient to demonstrate that the 
agencies’ interpretation of the statute is unreasonable.110 
 
104.  Cf. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528–29 (2007) (no deference 
to an agency interpretation that runs counter to unambiguous statutory text). 
105.  See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 213 (1988) 
(“Deference to what appears to be nothing more than an agency’s convenient 
litigating position would be entirely inappropriate.”); see also United States v. 
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001) (giving less deference to informal agency 
interpretations, like amicus briefs (where the agency obviously is not a party to 
the litigation) or informal guidance documents); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 
U.S. 134, 139–40 (1944) (explaining Skidmore deference as deference to the 
extent the agency’s interpretation is persuasive). 
106.  Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014) (“We 
expect Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency decisions of 
vast ‘economic and political significance.’” (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000))). 
107.  See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488–89 (2015). 
108.  Reclassification of the American Alligator and Other Amendments, 40 
Fed. Reg. 44,412, 44,414 (Sept. 26, 1975) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). 
109.  See id. In Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United 
States, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that agencies are required to engage in reasoned decision making, 
i.e. to explain the basis for their decisions. 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
110.  See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015). 
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The first time the agencies articulated an interpretation of 
Section 4(d) that could sustain the blanket extension was in 
Sweet Home.111  However, interpretations articulated for the first 
time in briefing are not entitled to Chevron deference.112  At 
most, they receive less permissive Skidmore deference.113  
Assuming Skidmore deference is appropriate, the Services’ 
interpretation must nonetheless be rejected because (a) it is 
inconsistent with the unambiguous statutory text114 and (b) it 
conflicts with the agency’s representation to Congress when the 
statute was being considered.115  The agency’s reversal is even 
more damning in light of its failure to offer any reasoned 
explanation for it.116  Consequently, the interpretation of Section 
4(d) required to save the blanket extension does not qualify for 
Skidmore deference. 
The breadth of the asserted power provides a further reason 
why deference is inappropriate. Recently, the Supreme Court 
clarified that when Congress wants to allow agencies to make 
 
111.  Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or. v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1, 6 
(D.C. Cir. 1993). 
112.  See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 213 (1988) 
(“Deference to what appears to be nothing more than an agency’s convenient 
litigating position would be entirely inappropriate.”). There is a circuit split on 
the question of whether an agency’s interpretation articulated as a litigant, as 
opposed to as amicus, is entitled to any deference under Skidmore. See Hubbard, 
supra note 42, at 460–66. 
113.  Hubbard, supra note 42, at 460–66. Skidmore deference is extremely 
limited and has been criticized as deference only to the extent an interpretation 
has the power to persuade, i.e. no deference at all. See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain 
Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1340 & n.6 (2011) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting); see also Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the 
Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1302–03 (2007). 
114.  See supra notes 46–102 and accompanying text. 
115.  See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 145–46, 
155–56 (2000) (arguing Congressional testimony from FDA representatives that 
they lacked authority to regulate cigarettes under the Food Drug and Cosmetics 
Act undermined the agency’s later assertion of that authority); see also Univ. of 
Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2533 (2013) (“The weight of 
deference afforded to agency interpretations under Skidmore depends upon . . . 
‘its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements[.]’” (quoting Skidmore v. 
Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944))). 
116.  See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 537 (2009) 
(stating where an agency changes its policy, it must provide a reasoned 
explanation for the change or its actions may be arbitrary and capricious); Motor 
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 
U.S. 29, 48 (1983) (same). 
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“decisions of vast ‘economic and political significance’” it must say 
so clearly.117  Forbidding any activity that affects any threatened 
species, including those that become so at any point in the future, 
meets this standard. Presently, there are hundreds of animals 
listed as threatened, most of which are subject to the blanket 
extension of the take prohibition.118  However, nothing limits this 
number from growing substantially.119  Protections for these 
species can have severe economic and political consequences.120  
Since Congress did not clearly say that the agencies had this 
great power, it should not be assumed from an arguable 
ambiguity. 
 
117.  Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014) 
(quoting Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 160). 
118.  See U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Species Reports, ENVTL. CONSERVATION 
ONLINE SYS., http://ecos.fws.gov/tess_public/reports/ad-hoc-species-report? 
kingdom=V&kingdom=I&status=E&status=T&status=EmE&status=EmT&stat
us=EXPE&status=EXPN&status=SAE&status=SAT&fcrithab=on&fstatus=on&
fspecrule=on&finvpop=on&fgroup=on&header=Listed+Animals 
[http://perma.cc/EYU4-AV37].  
119.  This result is likely in light of the growth in “mega-petitions”—
petitions to add species to the list by the hundreds. See U.S. Fish & Wildlife 
Serv., Listing Program Work Plan Questions and Answers (July 12, 2011), 
http://www.fws.gov/endangered/improving_ESA/FWS%20Listing%20Program%2
0Work%20Plan%20FAQs%20FINAL.PDF [http://perma.cc/TW3L-FTEM]. 
120.  The total cost of species protection under the Endangered Species Act 
is not known. The federal government reports only its costs of administering the 
statute. See, e.g., U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., FEDERAL AND STATE ENDANGERED 
AND THREATENED SPECIES EXPENDITURES: FISCAL YEAR 6 (2013), 
http://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/2013.EXP.FINAL.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/HTY7-HG5Y]; see also John R. Platt, How Much Did the U.S. 
Spend on the Endangered Species Act in 2012?, Sci. Am. (Nov. 1, 2013), 
http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/extinction-countdown/2013/11/01/ 
endangered-species-act-2012/ [http://perma.cc/P7FW-UH28]. This figure grossly 
underestimates the statute’s true cost because it ignores those borne by private 
parties, especially opportunity costs. See JONATHAN H. ADLER, REBUILDING THE 
ARK: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT REFORM, 14–15 (Adler, ed. 
2011); RANDY T. SIMMONS & KIMBERLY FROST, PROP. & ENV’T RES. CTR., 
ACCOUNTING FOR SPECIES: THE TRUE COSTS OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 
(2004), http://perc.org/sites/default/files/esa_costs.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q3Z6-
TV3H]; Jonathan Wood, A Lesson in Logic; Or How to Honestly Evaluate 
Government Policies, PAC. LEGAL FOUND. LIBERTY BLOG (Nov. 4, 2013), 
http://blog.pacificlegal.org/2013/a-lesson-in-logic-or-how-to-honestly-evaluate-
government-policies/ [http://perma.cc/8233-KP54]. 
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IV.  THE STATUTE’S APPROACH WOULD MORE 
FAIRLY DISTRIBUTE THE COSTS OF 
PROTECTING THREATENED SPECIES 
It makes sense that Congress would have treaded lightly in 
regulating private activity to protect species. For those subject to 
the regulation, the consequences are profound.121  Donald Barry 
of the World Wildlife Fund once likened the statute to a pit bull 
because it is “short, compact, and has a hell of a set of teeth.”122  
Perhaps the sharpest of those teeth is the take prohibition.123  
Property owners whose land provides habitat to species can see 
their rights to use and enjoy their property extinguished entirely 
once the species has been listed.124 
Congress determined that these profound burdens placed on 
a relatively few individuals are justified by the dire threats faced 
by endangered species.125  An endangered species faces an 
immediate risk of extinction, a consequence that is likely 
 
121.  See supra note 120.  
122.  Timothy Egan, Strongest U.S. Environment Law May Become 
Endangered Species, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 1992), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
1992/05/26/us/strongest-us-environment-law-may-become-endangered-
species.html?pagewanted=all [http://perma.cc/C9F8-VXB8]. 
123.  See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text. 
124.  See Robert Meltz, Where the Wild Things Are:  The Endangered 
Species Act and Private Property, 24 ENVTL. L. 369, 378–84 (1994). The Services 
systematically underestimate these costs because they adopt a so-called 
“baseline approach” which omits much of the burdens on private property 
owners imposed under the act. See N.M. Cattle Growers Ass’n v. U.S. Fish & 
Wildlife Serv., 248 F.3d 1277, 1285 (10th Cir. 2001) (discussing the baseline 
approach). Because the Service regulates take of most threatened species under 
the blanket prohibition, it never gives any consideration to the necessity and 
appropriateness of imposing these costs. See Jonathan Wood, PLF Comments on 
Caribou Downlisting, PAC. LEGAL FOUND. LIBERTY BLOG (June 26, 2014) 
http://blog.pacificlegal.org/2014/plf-comments-caribou-downlisting/ 
[http://perma.cc/5W5P-9C4L]. There is some evidence that property owners have 
preemptively destroyed or degraded habitat to avoid the burdens of take and 
habitat regulations. See, e.g., Dean Lueck & Jeffrey A. Michael, Preemptive 
Habitat Destruction Under the Endangered Species Act, 46 J.L. & ECON. 27, 51–
52 (2003); see also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION: 
THE UNCERTAIN QUEST FOR LIMITED GOVERNMENT 355–56 (2014); Ronald Bailey, 
“Shoot, Shovel, and Shut Up”: Celebrating 30 Years of Failing to Save 
Endangered Species, REASON.COM (Dec. 31, 2003), http://reason.com/archives/ 
2003/12/31/shoot-shovel-and-shut-up [http://perma.cc/E4RR-M62D]. 
125.  See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
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irreversible.126  Threatened species facing more remote risks 
require a different calculus and more caution before imposing 
severe costs.127  The statute provides that the costs of this 
proactive protection should be distributed across society as a 
whole, by imposing burdens chiefly on federal agencies.128  Since 
this extra level of protection benefits the public generally, it 
makes sense that the costs would be borne by all too.129  Voiding 
the blanket extension and returning to the statute’s approach to 
protecting threatened species will thus lead to a fairer 
distribution of the costs of providing this protection. 
Of course, for some threatened species, efforts by government 
agencies would not be enough. Regulating private activity to 
protect them may be necessary.130  Congress could not have 
known which threatened species would require this protection. 
Thus, it delegated the power to identify these species to the 
Services.131  However, if anything is clear from the statutory text, 
Congress intended endangered and threatened species to be 
treated differently, corresponding to the differing degrees of the 
threats they face.132  Under the blanket regulation, however, 
these categories receive essentially the same treatment.133 
 
126.  See Katherine M. Hausrath, Note, The Designation of “Distinct 
Population Segments” Under The Endangered Species Act In Light Of National 
Association of Homebuilders v. Norton, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 449, 479–80 (2005) 
(discussing irreversibility and the precautionary approach); cf. Norman F. 
Carlin et al., How to Permit Your Mammoth:  Some Legal Implications of “De-
extinction,” 33 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 7–18 (2014) (discussing the possibility of 
reviving an extinct species through cloning). 
127.  See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text; cf. Armstrong v. 
United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (describing the Takings Clause as barring 
“Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all 
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”). 
128.  See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1534–1537a (2012). Unlike the take prohibition, the 
obligations imposed on federal agencies are the same with respect to protecting 
threatened and endangered species. Id. § 1536. Ultimately, the costs of these 
protections are spread across society as a whole, through taxes. Cf. Armstrong, 
364 U.S. at 49. 
129.  The vast majority of protected species are found on private lands. See 
ADLER, supra note 120, at 6–7. 
130.  See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
131.  16 U.S.C. §1533(d). 
132.  Compare 16 U.S.C. § 1533, with 16 U.S.C. § 1538; see also supra notes 
722–755 and accompanying text. 
133.  See 50 C.F.R. § 17.31(a) (2015); see also MIDWEST REGION, U.S. FISH & 
WILDLIFE SERV., WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ENDANGERED AND 
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A related salutary benefit of returning to the statutory 
scheme is that it would encourage the agencies to develop 
evidence on the burdens associated with regulating take. Under 
Michigan v. EPA, they would have to identify and consider these 
impacts when assessing whether regulation is necessary and 
advisable.134  Through this process, we might finally develop 
reliable estimates for these costs, which have long been unseen 
and ignored.135 
Ironically, the Services’ interpretation inverts the statutory 
framework. The burdens imposed on individuals are only reduced 
if necessary and appropriate for the conservation of the 
species.136  According to current agency practice, the severity of 
the imposition on individuals is given no consideration at any 
point.137  This is unfair to those burdened by this regulation and 
inconsistent with the recognition during the Congressional 
debates that the statute’s stringent prohibition should be a last 
resort.138 
 
THREATENED? (2003), http://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/t-vs-e.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/5X5W-MPZ5] (noting that a threatened listing includes all of 
the same protections as endangered except the Service has the flexibility to 
“scal[e] back” these protections if appropriate). 
134.  See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015). 
135.  These costs are likely unseen because they are due to foregone 
activity. The failure to identify and consider such costs is a common problem, 
referred to as the broken window fallacy. See FREDERIC BASTIAT, THAT WHICH IS 
SEEN, AND THAT WHICH IS NOT SEEN (1850), reprinted in 51 IDEAS IN LIBERTY 12, 
13 (2001). 
136.  See, e.g., Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Final Rule 
Revising the Special Rule for the Utah Prairie Dog, 77 Fed. Reg. 46,158, 46,159 
(Aug. 2, 2012) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) (deeming it necessary and 
advisable to the conservation of the Utah prairie dog to relax the take 
prohibition for that threatened species); Keith Saxe, Note, Regulated Taking of 
Threatened Species Under The Endangered Species Act, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 399, 
425–438 (1988) (arguing that the Service has only limited authority to permit 
take of threatened species, without observing that the Service’s approach has 
flipped the statutory standard on its head). 
137.  See, e.g., Final Rule Revising the Special Rule for the Utah Prairie 
Dog, 77 Fed. Reg. at 46,159. 
138.  See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text. 
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V.  THE STATUTE’S APPROACH CREATES 
BETTER INCENTIVES FOR PRIVATE 
CONSERVATION AND SPECIES RECOVERY 
The statute’s presumption against the application of the take 
prohibition to threatened species is also likely to redound to the 
benefit of species. By treating endangered and threatened species 
differently, the statute gives private landowners an incentive to 
proactively minimize impacts on threatened species, to head off 
an endangered listing, and recover endangered species, to enjoy 
the benefits of a downlisting.139 
The current punitive approach is likely counterproductive. 
Due to the harsh burdens placed on those who own property 
inhabited by protected species, there is a strong incentive to 
eradicate the species or destroy its habitat before it is protected 
or discovered by regulators.140  If the property owner allows her 
property to remain suitable habitat—which one would expect to 
be praiseworthy—she could ultimately lose the right to use her 
property in the future, lest developing or using it results in 
take.141  Consequently, property owners who otherwise might 
have been willing to accommodate species conservation may have 
little choice but to convert their property before it becomes 
subject to regulation. This not only makes the property owner 
worse off but also harms the very species the regulation is 
supposed to protect.142 
The government appears to be recognizing this problem. The 
Fish and Wildlife Service recently proposed to rely more heavily 
on proactive voluntary conservation as a preferred means of 
 
139.  See ADLER, supra note 120, at 16–18 (discussing the problem of the 
take prohibition’s perverse incentives). 
140.  EPSTEIN, supra note 124, at 355–56; Bailey, supra note 124. See 
generally Lueck & Michael, supra note 124. 
141.  See Jonathan Wood, PLF Asks Court to Rule on the Constitutionality 
of Utah Prairie Dog Regulation, PAC. LEGAL FOUND. LIBERTY BLOG (Nov. 19, 
2013), http://blog.pacificlegal.org/2013/plf-asks-court-to-rule-on-the-
constitutionality-of-utah-prairie-dog-regulation/ [http://perma.cc/E7MW-A4GR] 
(arguing protection of the Utah prairie dog prevented people from farming and 
protecting an airport and cemetery from a rodent infestation). 
142.  BRIAN SEASHOLES, REASON FOUND., FULFILLING THE PROMISE OF THE 
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT:  THE CASE FOR AN ENDANGERED SPECIES RESERVE 
PROGRAM 22 (2014), http://reason.org/files/endangered_species_act_reform.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/W2QN-44QB]. 
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protecting species. On July 22, 2014, the Service proposed a 
policy to reward landowners who take preemptive measures to 
conserve species prior to their listing.143  It takes advantage of 
similar incentives using Candidate Conservation Agreements 
with Assurances144 and Safe Harbor agreements.145  These 
schemes recognize, if only implicitly, that the take prohibition’s 
harshness is not the best way to encourage landowners to use 
their private property to convey a public benefit like species 
conservation. A preferable approach is to encourage landowners 
to conserve species in order to avoid the harshness of the 
prohibition.146 
Returning to the scheme Congress created would better 
encourage private conservation efforts in two ways. First, the 
prospect of the take prohibition’s application if a species becomes 
endangered is a big stick that property owners would do well to 
avoid.147  Since this prohibition does not apply to threatened 
species under the statutory scheme,148 property owners, 
communities, and states whose lands contain threatened species 
would have an incentive to protect them voluntarily—though in 
ways less burdensome than the take prohibition—to avoid this 
consequence. 
Would this incentive be enough to overcome the risk that the 
property owner might follow the “shoot, shovel, and shut up” 
approach? Although we cannot know for sure, private 
conservation efforts to avoid potential listings provide powerful 
 
143.  Policy Regarding Voluntary Prelisiting Conservation Actions, 79 Fed. 
Reg. 42,525, 42,525 (July 22, 2014); see also News Release, U.S. Fish & Wildlife 
Serv., New Policy Proposed to Benefit At-Risk Wildlife, Provide Credits to 
Landowners Taking Voluntary Conservation Actions (July 17, 2014), http:// 
www.fws.gov/endangered/improving_ESA/pdf/Prelisting%20policy%20news%20r
elease%20FINAL%20FORMATTED.pdf [http://perma.cc/UWH6-YDDH].  
144.  U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., CANDIDATE CONSERVATION AGREEMENTS 
(2011), http://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/CCAs.pdf [http://perma. 
cc/LJ5R-E8JE].  
145. Safe Harbor Agreements: Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. FISH & 
WILDLIFE SERV., http://www.fws.gov/endangered/landowners/landowners-faq. 
html [http://perma.cc/3KKD-2LUE] (last updated July 15, 2013).  
146.  See Damien M. Schiff, The Endangered Species Act at 40:  A Tale of 
Radicalization, Politicization, Bureaucratization, and Senescence, 37 ENVIRONS 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 105, 128–31 (2014) (arguing that a compensatory, as 
opposed to punitive, regime would better prioritize and protect species). 
147.  See ADLER, supra note 120, at 14–15. 
148.  16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (2012). 
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evidence that it could be.149  Take the greater sage grouse. The 
proposed listing of this species would affect eleven states and 
approximately 165 million acres.150  The listing would threaten 
agriculture, ranching, and, most significantly, oil and gas 
development across the region.151  To avoid these severe 
consequences, private landowners, industry, conservation groups, 
local, state, and federal governments formed the Sage Grouse 
Initiative, which facilitates private conservation efforts.152  
Through this voluntary cooperation, 4.4 million acres of habitat 
have been restored and over $400 million invested in the species’ 
conservation.153  The motivation behind the private cooperation 
was clear:  to ward off a listing and its consequences.154 
Another example is the Fish and Wildlife Service’s recent 
decision not to list the dunes sagebrush lizard in recognition of 
voluntary state and private conservation efforts that ameliorated 
 
149.  Cf. Policy for Evaluation of Conservation Efforts When Making 
Listing Decisions, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,100 (Mar. 28, 2003) (federal policy 
encouraging state and private conservation efforts as an alternative to listing 
species); U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., PECE EVALUATION FOR THE NEW MEXICO 
CCA/CCAA AND TEXAS CONSERVATION PLAN 39 (2012), http://www.fws.gov/ 
southwest/es/Documents/R2ES/DSL_PECE_NM_and_TX_06112012.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/LV99-J3L5] (applying this policy to state plans to conserve the 
dunes sagebrush lizard and noting that the affirmative conservation measures 
achieved under them would not likely be achieved by a listing). 
150.  U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.,THE GREATER SAGE-GROUSE:  FACTS, 
FIGURES AND DISCUSSION, http://www.fws.gov/greatersagegrouse/factsheets/ 
GreaterSage GrouseCanon_FINAL.pdf [http://perma.cc/685P-PUL4]. 
151.  Reid Wilson, Western States Worry Decision on Bird’s Fate Could Cost 
Billions in Development, WASH. POST (May 11, 2014), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/05/11/western-states-worry-decision-
on-birds-fate-could-cost-billions-in-development/ [https://perma.cc/TL2N-RKSB]; 
see David Wilms & Anne Alexander, The North American Model of Wildlife 
Conservation in Wyoming:  Understanding It, Preserving It, and Funding Its 
Future, 14 WYO. L. REV. 659, 689–90 (2014) (reporting that the listing would, in 
Wyoming alone, threaten 4,000 jobs, $255 million in income, and $30 million in 
state tax revenue). 
152.  U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., OUTCOMES IN CONSERVATION: SAGE GROUSE 
INITIATIVE 1 (2005), http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/PA_NRCSConsumption/ 
download?cid=stelprdb1270408&ext=pdf [http://perma.cc/5GWJ-ZWZG].  
153.  Id. 
154.  Cf., e.g., Keith Ridler, Idaho Puts Forward Plan to Protect Sage 
Grouse Habitat, WASH. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/ 
news/2015/feb/22/idaho-puts-forward-plan-to-protect-sage-grouse-hab/ 
[http://perma.cc/WV9D-939L] (quoting the Director of the Idaho Department of 
Lands, which put forward a conservation plan, as explaining “[i]t’s a balance . . . 
but we think in the long run avoiding a listing is a good thing”). 
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the threats to that species.155  In 2010, the Service proposed 
listing the lizard as an endangered species, a decision that would 
significantly restrict land use and oil and gas extraction in 
Texas.156  To avoid these significant consequences, the State 
worked with property owners, industry, and biologists to develop 
a plan to develop higher quality data on the species’ status and 
encourage voluntary conservation, without the dire costs that 
would be incurred if listed.157  So far, more than two hundred 
thousand acres of dunes sagebrush lizard habitat have been 
enrolled for conservation.158 
These examples demonstrate that avoiding the severe 
burdens associated with the take prohibition can be a powerful 
incentive to spur private actions that benefit species. If 
governments, landowners, and industry will go to such lengths to 
avoid a listing under the current regime, it stands to reason that 
they would also do so to avoid a species declining to the point of 
being endangered, if the statutory scheme was restored. 
If this incentive falls short for a particular species, the 
statutory scheme adequately addresses that concern. First, and 
most obviously, if a species continues to decline, it can be listed as 
endangered and the take prohibition will apply with full force.159  
Alternatively, the Service may craft a species-specific 
regulation—provided that it is necessary and advisable for the 
conservation of that species—to regulate bad actors, particular 
types of take or all take of the threatened species.160 
The blanket prohibition against takes of threatened species 
undermines a second important incentive for private 
conservation—the prospect of a downlisting. Under the statute, a 
 
155.  Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Withdrawal of the 
Proposed Rule to List Dunes Sagebrush Lizard, 77 Fed. Reg. 36,872, 36,884–99 
(June 19, 2012). 
156.  See id. at 36,872, 36,885. 
157.  See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., TEXAS CONSERVATION PLAN FOR THE 
DUNES SAGEBRUSH LIZARD 1–2 (2011); Brian Seasholes, A Big Win for 
Endangered Species, Texas and Real Conservation:  A Big Loss for Lawsuit-
based Conservation, REASON FOUND. (Oct. 2, 2014), http://reason.org/blog/show/a-
big-win-for-endangered-species-an [http://perma.cc/Y3BC-R3Q8]; see also Defs. 
of Wildlife v. Jewell, 70 F. Supp. 3d 183, 199 (D.D.C. 2014) (upholding the 
Service’s decision not to list the dunes sagebrush lizard). 
158.  Seasholes, supra note 157. 
159.  16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (2012). 
160.  Id. § 1533(d). 
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species’ improvement from endangered to threatened should be a 
cause for celebration amongst affected landowners. The lifting of 
the take prohibition rewards them for their role in a species’ 
recovery. Under current agency practice, on the other hand, the 
distinction between endangered and threatened is superficial.161  
The only beneficiaries are the agencies, which claim greater 
discretion and power in the case of threatened species. 
The blanket regulation’s misincentives may partially explain 
why the Endangered Species Act has not been the effective 
species recovery tool that its proponents hoped. In the forty years 
since it was enacted, approximately one percent of the species 
subject to its protections have recovered.162  A similar amount 
have been delisted because they were improperly listed in the 
first place or have become extinct, notwithstanding the statute’s 
protections.163  Although many conservation groups describe the 
statute as a success because relatively few species have gone 
extinct since its adoption,164 it is difficult to square this metric 
with the statute’s goals. Congress’ aim in adopting the 
Endangered Species Act was not to create a regime under which 
species at risk of extinction would remain forever on the 
precipice. To the contrary, the intent was to conserve and recover 
species.165  Incentivizing private conservation is the best means 
of accomplishing that aim. The agencies’ command-and-control 
approach gets the incentives wrong: it severely punishes those 
 
161.  See Patricia Sagastume, Reclassifying Florida Manatees:  From 
Endangered to Threatened, AL JAZEERA AM. (Aug. 8, 2014 5:00 AM) 
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/8/8/reclassifying-
floridamanatees.html [http://perma.cc/E7DN-XJY4] (quoting Chuck Underwood, 
a Fish and Wildlife Service spokesman, as saying that “[p]eople have 
misperceptions that we have two lists. It’s one classification. Being endangered 
or threatened relates to whether a species is moving toward extinction or not.”). 
162.  ADLER, supra note 120, at 9–10; M. LYNNE CORN & KRISTINA 
ALEXANDER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42945, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 
(ESA) IN THE 113TH CONGRESS:  NEW AND RECURRING ISSUES 2, 6 (2014).  
163.  CORN & ALEXANDER, supra note 162, at 6. 
164.  See generally KIEREN SUCKLING ET AL., CTR. FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, 
ON TIME, ON TARGET: HOW THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT IS SAVING AMERICA’S 
WILDLIFE (2012), http://www.esasuccess.org/pdfs/110_REPORT.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/XP5C-HAXY]; DEFS. OF WILDLIFE, ASSAULT ON WILDLIFE: THE 
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT UNDER ATTACK (2011), http://www.defenders.org/ 
publication/assault-wildlife-endangered-species-act-under-attack.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/E83F-RMST]. 
165.  See ADLER, supra note 120, at 9–10. 
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who have maintained their property in a suitable condition for 
imperiled species, and it denies landowners any reward for their 
role in restoring a species to the point where the extinction risk is 
more remote. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Services’ reversal of Congress’ decision to regulate 
private activity to protect only endangered species was incorrectly 
upheld by the only court to consider that question. Many of the 
reasons why that decision was incorrect were not presented to the 
court. The interpretation necessary to save the regulation 
extending the take prohibition to all threatened species is 
inconsistent with the statute’s text, legislative history, and the 
constitutional avoidance canon. More recent Supreme Court 
decisions cast the regulation into even further doubt. 
Restoring the statutory scheme would have two laudatory 
benefits. First, it would be fairer. The costs of providing 
prophylactic protections to threatened species would fall on the 
government and, ultimately, society as a whole rather than a 
relatively few individuals. Second, it could reverse the perverse 
incentives that currently prevail under the take prohibition. 
Generally, leaving take of threatened species unregulated would 
give property owners an incentive to stop their slide towards 
endangered status, to avoid being subject to the take prohibition, 
and recover endangered species so that they may be downlisted 
and the take prohibition lifted. The Agencies’ approach, on the 
other hand, deprives these categories of significance by treating 
endangered and threatened species the same. 
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